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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
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4	IN RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION : Case No. 1:17-md-2804 OPIATE LITIGATION : Cleveland, Ohio
5	: : FINAL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS : Tuesday, October 15, 2019
6	: 12:34 p.m.
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11	TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAN AARON POLSTER
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14	
15	SPECIAL MASTER: DAVID R. COHEN
16	
17	Court Reporter: Donnalee Cotone, RMR, CRR, CRC
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24	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
25	produced by computer-aided transcription.

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1	AFTERNOON SESSION, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2019
2	(Proceedings commenced at 12:34 p.m.)
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4	DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
12:39:53 5	THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon.
6	Please be seated.
7	All right. Well, we're here for the final pretrial in
8	the opoid MDL, first bellwether trial, Summit County,
9	Cuyahoga County, against various defendants.
12:40:16 10	So the lawyers, parties, are here. We have a number
11	of matters I wanted to cover.
12	All right. We're set to begin jury selection
13	tomorrow. We'll have 50, the first 50 jurors brought in.
14	The jury department will pick them at random from the
12:40:59 15	roughly 150 people that we have left.
16	The Court and the parties will know this afternoon
17	which 50, and then the order will be determined randomly
18	tomorrow morning, and we'll that will be the order.
19	If we question jurors privately in chambers, we'll
12:41:30 20	just have one lawyer for each of the two plaintiffs and one
21	lawyer for each of the defendants. There will be no
22	parties, no consultants, just I don't want to overwhelm
23	the jurors.
24	There were many motions in limine filed, and I'm going
12:41:57 25	to summarize my rulings now.

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I'll try to be efficient, and I will say at the outset that my main job in this trial, once we pick a fair and impartial jury, is to have the same strike zone for each side. Probably no one is going to like my strike zone, but I worked very hard to have the same strike zone for each side. And I will say at the outset, I'm going to have a very wide strike zone when it comes to the parties introducing evidence about what the federal government, DEA, FDA, did or did not do. That's an essential part of the story, the narrative.

The facts are the facts. Each side is going to use those facts in their narrative for the jury and for public consumption, and I'm going to let both sides have a great deal of latitude on that. We're obviously not going to have witnesses purporting to tell the jury what the law is, but in terms of what the DEA and FDA did or didn't do, and what implications that would have, I'm going to let both sides have at it.

All right. I'm going to start with a series of motions filed by defendant Henry Schein.

Schein's number 1, pleading 2645, is denied. But it is important that if the plaintiffs or witnesses use the term defendants, if they don't mean it to mean all of the defendants in this case, they've got to be specific, because it isn't fair just to lump everyone together. That isn't

fair, and it's going to be confusing.

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So the witnesses and the lawyers need to be careful about that. If they do mean all of the defendants in this case, fine; but if it's less than all, then they need to be specific.

Schein number 2 is also denied.

Schein number 3 is denied without prejudice, but the Schein defendants may object to any specific evidence or argument that they feel is factually inaccurate and/or lacks foundation.

Schein number 4 is denied. That relates to medications distributed by Schein to Dr. Brian Heim. That evidence can come in.

Schein number 5 is denied, reference's to Dr. Heim's indictment.

Schein number 6, references to Dr. Harper, is also denied.

Schein number 7 is denied.

Schein number 8 is also denied. It may be relevant. Evidence about drugs distributed outside of Summit County may also be denied.

Schein 9 is also denied. It references the DEA fines, investigations, or admonitions. It's denied without prejudice. If defendant Schein thinks that something is relevant or extremely prejudicial, they can raise that

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Schein number 10 references the cease and desist letter, is also denied.

And Schein number 11 is denied as to statute of limitations.

And Schein number 12 is denied, references to Henry Schein Animal Health.

All right, turning to Walgreens motions in limine.

Number 1, evidence or argument about Walgreens' ownership interest in AmerisourceBergen is denied.

Number two, evidence relating to Florida DEA enforcement action and related settlement, that's denied. That goes with my general comments.

Number 3, references to DEA witness Joseph Rannazzisi as the 60-Minute man. I'm going to allow brief accurate references to the fact that Mr. Rannazzisi, who was a former DEA deputy administrator, did appear on 60 Minutes and other news reports because that happened, but the plaintiffs can't overemphasize or dwell on these facts, and they're not to refer to him at all as the 60-Minute man unless that's a nickname that -- in fact, I don't think -- I'm not going to allow that at all. It's not relevant that someone may have called him the 60-Minute man, so he'll just be Mr. Rannazzisi. And if he appeared on 60 Minutes, quite frankly, either side can raise that, and the defendants may

use it to impeach him.

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All right. Plaintiffs' omnibus motion in limine. I'm going to grant the motion. There's not going to be -- number one, there's not going to be any evidence or testimony about attorneys' fee arrangements or how litigation expenses are paid, or anything about that. That is not relevant.

Number two, the plaintiffs have withdrawn their motion to preclude testimony as to when parties selected, hired, or were considering hiring attorneys. I will grant the second part of the motion, any testimony as to the actual arrangements or details of how attorneys are being paid or how they're being retained; but when a Summit County or Cuyahoga official retained or considered retaining an attorney may be relevant.

Number three is denied as moot. The parties have worked that out, as with number four.

Number five, I'm granting in part. There will not be any reference to how attorneys for either side are being paid, how much they're being paid, how they travel. It is always admissible to ask an expert witness how much he or she is being paid directly or indirectly. Any form of compensation is fair game.

And a mode of transportation, if one is, you know, flying lavishly to or from court or around, and where

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they're getting the money to do that, parties can probe that. So it's fair game for witnesses, expert witnesses, it's not for attorneys.

Number six, reference to defendants' philanthropy or good deeds. Plaintiffs' motion is overbroad because it would preclude the defendants from saying anything about themselves.

So defendants are allowed to introduce themselves, describe accurately what they do, but evidence that parties and/or their employees are good citizens, do good deeds in the community, such as providing scholarships, community service, that's not relevant for the corporation or for any individual. That has nothing to do with this case, unless somehow someone feels that something specific that an employee is doing is relevant; but as a general rule, it's not, so that part is granted.

Number seven, reference to any alleged malpractice claims involving the parties' designated experts. I can't decide this in the abstract, so it may be relevant as to a particular witness. We'll have to deal with it as it comes.

Number eight, it's granted in part. The defendants -- well, I mean, I think it actually is fair game to call or refer or use expert reports of the other side if they were noticed in the litigation but not called, so I'm not sure what this refers to. If they weren't noticed,

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neither side can refer to the other sides' experts that weren't noticed; but if they were noticed and then a side decides not to call them, the other side is free to use them.

But if the witness isn't being called or the report is not being used by either side, the fact that there might be a malpractice claim against the witness is irrelevant. So you can't just generally say, well, the plaintiffs had on their list someone, and so-and-so has a malpractice claim, because if the person is not testifying, it's irrelevant.

All right. Number nine is denied without prejudice. People can use, you know -- can use technology to present their testimony or documents.

Number ten was resolved. It's moot, the parties worked that out.

Obviously, number 11 is granted. The reference to what motions in limine the parties filed or didn't file or the Court's ruling is not relevant to anything.

Number 12, related to punitive damages, is resolved as moot because the plaintiffs aren't seeking punitive damages, so there obviously won't be any reference to them.

Number 13 is granted. Defendants may not argue or suggest that the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations have not always imposed the duties that the Court has already determined, but this ruling does

not prevent any defendant from presenting evidence that DEA's guidance has been inconsistent and/or shifted over time, or to produce direct evidence of communications from DEA to that defendant as to anything the defendant was doing.

Number 14 is granted. I'm going to exclude any evidence or argument that plaintiffs' claims or verdicts would interfere and/or negatively impact the pharmaceutical industry and/or the government's regulation of the pharmaceutical industry.

Number 15, reference to the DEA approving or endorsing a particular defendant's suspicious order monitoring program. Again, this goes to what I said, so this is denied without prejudice. If the defendants have documents from the DEA relevant to one of their programs, they can introduce it.

16 is denied. That goes along with what I said, this is a suggestion or argument that DEA's failure to sanction or initiate enforcement. Both sides are free to bring in evidence about what DEA did or didn't do with their enforcement actions or their investigations and ask the jury to draw conclusions therefrom. That's fair game for both sides. So that was really 16 and 17 go together in that regard.

All right. 18 is granted, any reference to any award

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of damages might adversely affect the ability of any member of the jury or the public to purchase or have available medication. We're obviously not going to have any testimony or speculation on that.

19 is granted for the same reason. We're not going to have any testimony or speculation that a judgment might have an adverse affect on any defendant's ability to compete in the marketplace.

The same with 20. We're not going to have any testimony about that any verdict might adversely impact any defendant's incentive or ability to develop new drugs.

21 is also granted for the same reason.

22 is denied without prejudice. I can't address this in the abstract. If someone is trying to use deposition testimony from a deposition where the other side didn't have a -- wasn't present or didn't have a fair opportunity to be there, I'll have to address it in advance of that witness. So we'll have to take it up on a case-by-case basis, witness-by-witness basis.

23, relative to learned intermediary, is granted in part. The defendants may not argue or suggest they satisfied the duty to warn because of the mere existence of the learned intermediary doctrine. But of course defendants may argue that their warnings to doctors were accurate and that whatever happened is the doctor's responsibility after

that. That's part of their defense. They can defend against these claims using that if they wish.

Number 24 is denied. This relates to alleged failure to mitigate. If the defendants want to make that argument or evidence, they can do so.

25 is, obviously, going to be granted. We're not going to have the personal identification data of any children or any children in child protective custody.

And 26 is granted, too. We're not going to have testimony or evidence about individually-identifiable health information or medical records of any individual person. If someone somehow feels it's become relevant then to -- notice the Court in advance, and I'll address that.

Number 27, reference of identity of any undercover law enforcement personnel. I agree with plaintiffs, that everyone has got to take reasonable steps to protect the identity of undercover law enforcement personnel, but I'll need to know that in advance, because a lot of these people have testified in other proceedings, and if they have, well, there's no more confidentiality.

The same with number 28, about reference to individuals in the Cuyahoga County Jail. I'm not sure how it's relevant, but we'll take that up on a specific basis.

29, obviously there's not going to be any evidence about allegations of any county corruption, but if there's

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actual evidence of it and it's bearing on this case, well, then, that may be relevant.

All right. Number 30, I think, both sides agree that the fact of the grand jury proceeding is inadmissible. So there won't be any reference to a grand jury investigation, but if there are underlying facts that led to an investigation, that's fair game for either side.

- 31 is granted as unopposed.
- 32 is granted as unopposed.
- 33, again, is granted. We're not going to refer to general investigations of people. That's not relevant. If it led to an indictment and the charge is somehow relevant, then so be it.

34 represented about podcasts or media coverage regarding Cuyahoga County courts, that's -- I don't understand exactly what plaintiffs are trying to preclude or what the defendants are trying to admit, so that's denied without prejudice.

35, reference to any investigation regarding the death of Aniya Day Garrett. I'm not going to issue a blanket exclusion of this. I'm not sure how it's going to be relevant. So before someone introduces that, they're going to have to make a showing that it's relevant.

36, again, relates to corruption in Summit County.

The same thing, there's going to be no testimony about

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allegations. If there's evidence, actual evidence of corruption, it may be relevant.

37, deaths of an individual while in the Summit County Jail. That's denied without prejudice. Again, I fail to see how it would be relevant.

All right. Turning to Cardinal's motions in limine.

Number 1, evidence concerning 14,000 suspicious orders which Cardinal did not report and did not ship, that's denied.

Number 2 is denied, evidence and argument containing an interest in gossip e-mail.

Number 3, evidence based on data produced by Cardinal for the years 1996 through 2005 are denied, but all sides are to be careful so we're not comparing apples with oranges and drawing conclusions therefrom. So if you have 20 years of data, you can't say it leads to the same inference as 10 years, or the numbers are equivalent.

Turning to Track One defendants' omnibus motions in limine. Number 1, evidence or argument concerning future damages, that's granted, because plaintiffs can't seek future damages.

Number 2 is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs can introduce individualized evidence of description and shipments, but only if it was produced by the plaintiffs during discovery.

1 Number 3, I can't rule on these in the abstract, so 2 it's denied without prejudice. Number 4, lay and hearsay testimony about prescription 3 4 opioids being a gateway. It's denied as to factual testimony, testimony about facts is allowed. I'm not going 13:04:46 5 to allow fact witnesses to give expert testimony, however. 6 7 Number 5, evidence concerning lobbying, that's denied 8 without prejudice. It may be relevant. Obviously, everyone 9 is free to lobby state, local, federal officials. And there's nothing wrong about that, but it may be relevant to 13:05:14 10 11 go to intent, or it may be relevant -- again, there's a wide 12 open strike zone about what the federal government did or 13 didn't do, and it may be relevant as to why the federal 14 government did or didn't do something. 13:05:31 15 Number 6 I'm denying. Shipments to areas of the 16 country outside of Summit and Cuyahoga County may be 17 relevant. 18 I'm denying number 7. 19 I'm denying number 8. We've already addressed number 13:05:52 20 eight with Daubert rulings. I don't need to do it again. 21 Number 9, denying. 22 And 10, people can use charts and data. 23 Number 11, I'm granting in part and denying in part. 2.4 Evidence as to defendants' overall financial conditions, 13:06:19 25 sales, revenues, are not relevant. Defendants' evidence as

1 to revenues and profitability directly relating to opoid 2 sales may be relevant. Number 12 is denied without prejudice. I think it's 3 too broad, but, again, I don't think -- we're not going to 4 have individual witnesses being asked about their personal 13:06:47 5 feelings about the opoid crisis or who is responsible. That 6 7 would be improper questioning. 8 Number 13 was resolved by the parties, so that's moot. 9 14, I'm granting it. Some of the defendants will have corporate representatives at counsel table, some won't. 13:07:12 10 11 Some may have them some days, some may have them not other 12 days. We're not going to have any comment. It's not 13 relevant whether a corporate representative is here every 14 day or some of the days, so we're granting that. 13:07:31 15 All right. McKesson's motions in limine. 16 All right. Number 1 is denied without prejudice. 17 It's too broad. I'll deal with it as it comes up. 18 Number 2 is denied. Evidence relating to the U.S. 19 House Energy and Commerce Committee investigation, that may 13:07:55 20 be relevant. 21 Number 3, nationwide trends in drug deaths may be 22 relevant.

Number 4, evidence or argument about allegations

contained in letters from the DEA or DOJ. They may be

admissible, so I'm denying that.

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Number 5, I'm denying that, but additional rulings may be made via objections to deposition designations.

Number 6, testimony, documents, relating to McKesson's relationship with CVS and Rite Aid. That's denied, it may be relevant.

Turning to distributors' omnibus motions in limine.

Number 1 is denied. Settlements with the DEA in West Virginia may be relevant.

Number 2, nonparty corporate representatives

testifying to matters outside their personal knowledge, I'm

denying that without prejudice. But, obviously, a witness

may only testify to evidence within his or her personal

knowledge. If the witness is a corporate representative and

the witness knows from his or her experience what their own

company's practice is, they can testify to that, but they

can't speculate as to practices they don't know about or

something in some other department, or from a period of time

they don't know about.

I think everyone knows that.

All right. Evidence of criminal indictments and investigations without corresponding proof of final judgment or conviction. It's granted as to indictments that did not lead to a conviction.

It's denied as to general criminal investigations, unless the source of the information or other circumstances

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lack trustworthiness.

Number 4, prohibit plaintiffs from stating expressly or suggesting that the jury may infer that an older document never existed just because it cannot be found.

I'm denying this. This is -- this is for the jury.

If either sides wants to ask the jury to draw conclusions from the fact that a document can't be found, they can make the argument. The jury can draw whatever conclusion it wishes.

Number 5, evidence or arguments suggesting distributors committed a fraud on the DEA. Well, we don't have a fraud on the DEA claim here, so plaintiffs can't argue that there's a fraud on the DEA. But it's open game, open season on what DEA did or didn't do, or what the parties produced to DEA.

Number 6 ties in with something I said before, references broadly and generally to defendants. So I'm going to caution the plaintiffs that when -- if they mean argument or a question or -- question to apply to all defendants, fine; but if not, they're not just to lump them all in, they're to be specific.

Number 7, evidence and arguments about RICO predicates that plaintiffs did not identify in their discovery responses, that's denied.

Number 8 is denied.

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1 All right. Turning to Teva and Actavis motions in 2 limine. Number one, reference to the Cephalon misdemeanor 3 4 plea, that's denied. Reference to off-label promotion is denied. Reference 13:12:26 5 to the civil settlement between Cephalon and the Office of 6 7 Inspector General along with the settlement of the opoid 8 action brought by the Oklahoma attorney general, that's 9 denied. Evidence of any harm that may have occurred outside of 13:12:42 10 these two counties is denied. 11 12 Evidence of market relating shipments outside of these 13 two counties is denied. 14 Evidence regarding Teva's financial support of 13:12:57 15 third-party groups is denied, it may be relevant. 16 Testimony from Russell Portenoy is denied, but it's 17 probably moot because I'm not sure he's going to be 18 appearing. 19 Number eight, argument that the Actavis generic 13:13:17 20 defendants should have made additional warnings regarding 21 their generic medicines or should have stopped selling them 22 is granted in part and denied in part. 23 Under the Supreme Court established law, a defendant 2.4 doesn't have to stop selling. Defendants don't have to stop

selling, so no one can argue that they should have or were

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required to. But any evidence that any defendant engaged in false marketing, that's an essential part of the plaintiffs' claim. That can come in.

All right. I'm going to grant 9 and 10. The purchase price paid by Teva for Actavis I think is more prejudicial than probative, so it's out. And any reference to the settlement agreement between Teva and Allergan, that's granted, unopposed.

All right. I think that takes care of all the motions in limine.

All right. Obviously, I've given each side 100 hours so we get this trial to the jury well before Christmas.

Cardinal has raised a concern that it should get some additional time because so many of the Cardinal witnesses are going to be testifying live because it's within 100 miles of the Northern District of Ohio.

And the Court has some sympathy for Cardinal's argument. Obviously, you know, witnesses that are appearing by deposition, their testimony is limited. It's going to be limited to certain excerpts, and there won't be any live cross-examination.

I'm not -- I mean, the 100 hours is for the defendants to use as they please. I'm not saying that each defendant has to have, you know, 16 and a half hours or whatever. So I think that the testimony that -- that the hours should be

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used fairly, and obviously there needs to be and likely need to be more cross-examination of witnesses that are appearing live.

But I'm not going to -- I'm going to suggest that that's something for the defendants to work out among themselves. I'm not going to give Cardinal more hours or direct that the defendants allocate more to Cardinal, but I'm suggesting that everyone needs to be fair about that.

I think Special Master Cohen has dealt with how he wants the parties to deal with these deposition excerpt objections, to get them to him on a rolling basis. Everyone knows when the witnesses will appear, and he will deal with that.

All right. There were objections to witnesses. There were two or three that came in very late, and may be I can deal with them. If I can deal with them quickly now, I will.

All right. The first one, this is a third-party witness. David Gustin filed a motion to quash the plaintiffs' subpoena that he appear and testify.

All right. Mr. Gustin is a former employee of McKesson. He retired in 2016. He was director of regulatory affairs for the central region in early 2014. He gave a seven-hour videotape deposition in August of 2018, 500-page deposition.

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On March 21st of this year, Mr. Gustin was indicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky, a federal indictment on a felony charge alleging conspiracy with unnamed coconspirators to distribute and dispense a quantity of pills containing controlled substances between 2008 and 2016.

Mr. Gustin has represented through counsel that he will exercise his Fifth Amendment right if he testifies.

Now, I always took the position when I was a prosecutor that it was improper and prejudicial just to bring a witness in to a trial or jury to take the Fifth when everyone knew he was going to take the Fifth.

Can the plaintiffs articulate why it would be more probative than prejudicial to bring in Mr. Gustin just to take the Fifth? He's a former employee of McKesson. You have his deposition. You can seek to use his deposition. He's clearly an unavailable witness. He certainly has a Fifth Amendment right, and if anyone would challenge it, I most likely would overrule that challenge.

Can you articulate to me why it won't be unfairly prejudicial to him and to McKesson to bring him in and take the Fifth?

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, Peter Weinberger on behalf of plaintiffs. He doesn't have a right to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights when he is not a

defendant in the civil action. And so I understand your analysis, Your Honor, but he can be compelled to testify, and it is our preference that he respond to the subpoena, and that we not have to play a seven-hour deposition.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure -- you think -- whatever testimony he's given, he's given. All right? Anyone can use that. All right?

But now he has a present Fifth Amendment right because he's facing criminal indictment, and he's going to be asked questions about the conduct during the time period when he worked for McKesson during the indictment. You can challenge that, but I'm the one who would have to rule on the challenge, and I think you'd have a very, very uphill battle.

If you want to go through that, you can. And if I, you know -- but if I -- if you want to challenge his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, we're going to do that one night. We're not going to take up trial time, and -- but I think you're going to lose. He's got a Fifth Amendment right. If you're going to be asking him about anything he did during the time frame of that indictment, and I'm sure you are -- you're not going to be worried about what he did in 2003 or something -- I'm going to sustain his privilege.

I think we're going to leave it -- unless you can

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articulate in writing why he does not have a Fifth Amendment privilege to answer questions about conduct that forms the basis of the indictment, I'm going to quash it. But I'll wait for your response.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Judge Polster, Hunter Shkolnik.

Just if I can add to that. In situations like this, one option is that there's a stipulation that if the witness was called and asked about any of these facts, he would exercise his right under the Fifth Amendment, and it's a stipulation that we can rely upon and utilize as part of our evidence in chief. We're entitled to it.

THE COURT: But the only evidence then would be some prejudice that a former employee of McKesson is saying the Fifth. That's the whole point.

MR. SHKOLNIK: But the fact --

THE COURT: You think -- I mean, I don't think you can use against McKesson in this trial the fact that a retired employee whose now been indicted is exercising his Fifth Amendment right, the same way I don't think you can introduce against McKesson the fact that this guy has been indicted and say, well, that somehow shows that McKesson did something wrong.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Well, the indictment goes directly to his job title and the distribution, which serves as the basis of the claims.

1 THE COURT: I understand. An indictment is 2 only an allegation. That's the same reason I ruled on these 3 motions in limine. You can't just introduce evidence of indictments that didn't lead to convictions. That's unfair. 4 So unless the plaintiffs can convince me in writing, 13:22:38 5 clearly, that Mr. Gustin doesn't have a valid Fifth 6 7 Amendment right, I'm going to grant the motion to quash. 8 All right. Then we've got Cardinal Health's motion to 9 quash the trial subpoena of Jennifer Norris, who is 13:23:00 10 Cardinal's in-house counsel. 11 All right. I haven't read her deposition, all right? 12 I don't know what the plaintiffs are going to ask her. 13 Clearly, she can be subpoenaed to testify to anything within 14 her personal knowledge that's not privileged, and personal 13:23:25 15 knowledge could include her knowledge of Cardinal's general 16 practice and procedures. All right. That's her personal 17 knowledge. Anything beyond that would be speculation. 18 So I don't know -- you know, I think everyone knows 19 that. So I'm not going to quash the subpoena, because she 13:23:45 20 may have relevant testimony in this case which the 21 plaintiffs, if they want to have her live, can ask. 22 But if they ask her to guess or speculate, the 23 objection is going to be sustained. MS. MAINIGI: Enu Mainigi for Cardinal. 24 If I 13:24:02 25 may address that.

Miss Norris was not a percipient witness with anything having to do with anti-diversion. She did serve as the corporate representative, and in that capacity, she learned information for the purpose of providing 30(b)(6) testimony. She has now been issued a trial subpoena to appear live personally.

So she does not have personal knowledge, Your Honor, she served as the $30\,(b)\,(6)$.

any reason to doubt what you're saying. I don't know what the plaintiffs are going to ask her. They can subpoena anyone they want. They know they can't ask someone to guess or speculate. They're pretty experienced lawyers. They know I'm not going to allow a witness to guess or speculate or repeat hearsay, what someone told him or her, so I'm assuming they're calling her to ask permissible questions, the same way I'm assuming your witnesses, when you call them, you intend to ask them admissible questions.

So I'm denying the motion to quash the subpoena on the assumption that the plaintiffs understand the Rules of Evidence.

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, Peter Weinberger again. I just want to note for the record, we did file a written response with respect to the Gustin issue.

THE COURT: I guess I didn't see it. Anyway,

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1 I'm denying the motion to quash. Obviously, you can only 2 ask -- well, you filed something on Gustin? 3 MR. WEINBERGER: Yes. THE COURT: Well, can you articulate why you 4 don't think he has a Fifth Amendment privilege? 13:25:50 5 MR. WEINBERGER: Well, he may have a Fifth 6 7 Amendment privilege, but not one that he can assert in this 8 action. That's our point, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Well, that wouldn't be much of a Fifth Amendment privilege, Mr. Weinberger. 13:26:08 10 11 MR. WEINBERGER: It has to do with whether or 12 not he has been civilly sued in this case, which he has not. 13 And I think --14 THE COURT: But that has nothing to do -- his 13:26:23 15 Fifth Amendment privilege, he just needs a well-founded 16 belief that answers to these questions could, you know, 17 could hurt him, you know, could be used against him in a 18 criminal investigation, and he's under indictment. It's not 19 a quess or a speculation. He's under indictment, and you're 13:26:46 20 going to be asking him questions about that same period. 21 All right. I'm going to grant that motion. 22 MS. SINGER: Linda Singer for the plaintiffs. 23 Just to speak to the arguments that were made in the motion, 24 if I may, Your Honor, without speaking to whether he has a 13:27:01 25 right to invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege, I think

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plaintiffs have argued with case law support in its motion, which I do not have in front of me, unfortunately, that a witness taking a Fifth Amendment privilege which applies in a criminal proceeding, the plaintiffs are still entitled to claim an adverse inference in the civil litigation.

Mr. Gustin's responsibilities go directly to

McKesson's enforcement responsibilities that are at issue in

this case. And the fact that he cannot get up and testify

as to what he did or didn't do, as Your Honor has said, in

that capacity at McKesson goes directly to plaintiffs'

claims, and the jury is entitled to make an inference.

THE COURT: All right. I think it is far more prejudicial than probative, particularly since you have a 500-page deposition. You have the testimony, and you can put into evidence anything he testified to about what he did or didn't do, assuming it's within his personal knowledge, about all those things. You've got his answers.

So I'm granting that motion, that motion to quash is granted.

All right. I've already told the parties -- I'm going to reiterate, we're not going to be hopefully cluttering up this trial about objections to the admissibility of documents on grounds of authenticity. And if we do, and the objection is denied, I'm going to charge all that time to the party that objected. So both sides are aware of that.

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There was a motion that was filed this week by some or all of defendants asking me to order lawyers and witnesses not to discuss this case outside of the courtroom.

I mean, we already have it for lawyers. Specifically, it was to preclude attorneys and witnesses from discussing this case outside of the courtroom.

Certainly, my -- does anyone think there's a reason for the Court not to issue this order? I'm concerned -- I mean, I'm not sequestering this jury. There's already been a tremendous amount of publicity about this, all right. The jury is going to hear from the lawyers what the lawyers need to tell them with opening statements, closing arguments. They'll hear the questions. They'll hear from the witnesses what the witnesses need to tell them from their testimony.

Certainly, lawyers shouldn't be talking to the press about the case, and I don't think witnesses should be either. I don't think I've ever gagged witnesses, though, and then there's a question of should it apply to parties.

And the problem is, the plaintiffs are public officials, and so what does everyone think about this?

MR. SHKOLNIK: Your Honor, on behalf of Cuyahoga County, I think I feel comfortable. We just spoke with counsel. We don't have intentions of making statements regarding the trial, the case, but certainly, as government officials and the government, if issues related to opioids

1	do come up, to curtail the government or its representatives
2	or its officials from talking about it, I think that's too
3	far
4	THE COURT: Mr. Shkolnik, no way am I going to
13:31:42 5	try and curtail a public official's right to, you know, to
6	deal with the opoid crisis or talk about it.
7	I think the defendants' motion had to do with, like,
8	commenting on the trial or adding to their testimony, or
9	saying, you know, "I thought it was" you know what. If they
13:32:05 10	want to criticize me, that's fine. I don't care. But
11	something having to do with directly commenting on what
12	happened in the courtroom, that's what I'm talking about.
13	MR. SHKOLNIK: And I understood that,
14	Your Honor.
13:32:18 15	The county has no problem with not commenting upon the
16	trial and what is happening here.
17	THE COURT: All right.
18	MR. SHKOLNIK: I just wanted to make that
19	THE COURT: All right. I think I'm going to
13:32:30 20	issue that order. I don't want there to be any comment,
21	discussion by attorneys, parties, and witnesses, about
22	what's happened in the courtroom.
23	All right. Everyone has worked extremely hard and
24	done, I think, a terrific job in getting this case ready for
13:33:04 25	trial.

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The one aspect where I'm disappointed is the fact that we are about to begin this trial, and we don't have any semblance of final jury instructions. The parties only agreed on my boilerplate, which I didn't ask agreement about that. We sent that out so you wouldn't have to worry about that.

The submissions would lead one to conclude that this is the first civil RICO trial in this country. It obviously isn't, or the first public nuisance trial in any court in Ohio, which it's not.

And, you know, as a result, I didn't need those jury instructions for myself at the beginning. You all needed them. When I was a trial lawyer, I wanted to know what the law was before the case started, not after the evidence submissions were in, and I'm encouraging the parties who are here to urge their lawyers to work constructively.

The idea is not to gain these instructions or get every last ounce of argument in them. A jury instruction is to be conservative. By conservative, I mean it's what the law is, not what the law might be or should be. The law in this district, this circuit, this country, what it is on these issues.

You want an instruction that's going to be affirmed one way or the another; in other words, it's accurate. It's not argument, it's accurate. And you want it as clear as

possible to laypersons, which means as little legalese as possible. Some is inevitable, it's legal instructions.

That's what it should be.

And I know that if both sides, all sides work constructively, they can produce instructions that are 90 percent agreed upon. Yes, there may be a couple critical legal issues I'm going to have to rule on, okay, but I've never started a trial where there was nothing agreed on.

So as it now stands, you know, I'm going to be working on it. And if it takes two months it will take two months, and it won't be good for either side. But I'm making it clear now on the record that both sides, all parties, plaintiffs and the defendants, have waived any objection they have to not getting timely jury instructions, because it's of your own doing, their own doing.

You know, one of the key issues is joint and several liability. I'm going to have to decide that. I believe that the law imposes joint and several liability, but I'll certainly have to carefully look at that. But, again, I will work on that. If we've got to do it all ourselves from scratch, which is the way it is now, it's going to take a long time.

So, again, I would encourage some lawyers who aren't going to be in this courtroom daily doing the witnesses to work together, and to the extent you can submit anything

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that you agree upon, the odds are 99.9 percent that I'm going to give it, so I would encourage that.

I am working on preliminary jury instructions right now, and I've got to tell the parties something -- the jurors something about what they're going to be doing, what the claims are, and what they're going to have to consider.

And I'm going to have it to do it somewhat generally, and I will get that out to the parties this week so you can look at them. And if you think there's anything, you know, that's just flat out wrong, let me know. I don't want to create an error, but, again, it's preliminary instructions. So I'll get those out as soon as I can in a short turnaround time.

All right. We have some stipulations. I guess I need to know from all of you what you want me to do with them.

In some trials, the parties have wanted the judge to read them all at the beginning or all at the end, or at certain points; or sometimes the lawyers read them, you know, in conjunction with a particular witness. I really don't care, I just want to know.

And I generally include those in the final instructions, just so the jury is reminded of it, but you all have to figure out, you know, how you want to -- what you want to do with those.

And I'll take my cue from you.

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1 LAW CLERK: Right now we've got them in the 2 preliminary instructions. 3 THE COURT: Well, I don't know. I mean, one 4 idea I thought of would be to actually give each juror a copy of them that they can keep and have. I mean, if I read 13:38:00 5 off 20 stipulations, guess what? After number one or two, 6 7 they're going to glaze over and not know what it counts for. 8 A stipulation only makes sense in the context of some 9 testimony or documents. So what do you all think about giving each juror a printed copy of them? 13:38:21 10 11 I give each juror a copy of the final jury 12 instructions at the end. I don't give them the preliminary 13 instructions, but they're going to take back into their 14 room -- and I do that because, believe it or not, I had a 13:38:38 15 case where I was trying the case, and the judge gave one 16 copy, and the foreperson monopolized it and didn't show it 17 to anyone else. 18 It's hard to fathom, but it did happen to me. So when 19 I became a judge, every juror is going to get his or her own 13:38:58 20 copy. But what do you think about getting the copies. MR. LANIER: Your Honor, Mark Lanier for the 21 22 plaintiffs. Currently we have scheduled a meeting with

Special Master Cohen at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday to deal with

13:39:11 25 THE COURT: Okay.

exhibit issues.

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1	MR. LANIER: If the Court would indulge us,
2	we'll communicate with defense counsel between now and then,
3	and if we can't come up with an agreement deal with it with
4	the special master on Sunday.
13:39:23 5	THE COURT: Okay. If I just start off the
6	trial by reading 20 stipulations, Mr. Lanier, it's really a
7	waste.
8	MR. LANIER: Agreed.
9	THE COURT: At the end it may be useful with
13:39:34 10	the you know, after the summary and everything, but, so,
11	I'll take my cue from you.
12	MR. LANIER: Thank you, Judge.
13	All right. I'm reminding everyone that in terms of
14	our schedule, it looks like next Monday we'll be completely
13:39:55 15	opening statements. I don't think there will be time for
16	any witnesses. But we'll start with the testimony on
17	Tuesday.
18	There is no trial next Friday, October 25th. There's
19	no trial Monday, November the 11th, that being Veterans Day.
13:40:11 20	It's a federal holiday. And Thanksgiving week, the last
21	week of November, we're in trial only Monday and Tuesday,
22	the 25th and 26th.
23	So I'm going to tell all of the jurors that, so they
24	know.
13:40:33 25	I think I've got everything on my list. But now, is

That's my customary practice.

Then I will let each side take a short period of time to ask any additional questions, or maybe the same ones if you want to ask it in a different way. That's fine.

And then if there are questions often from

the -- maybe from the questionnaire that we want to question

individual jurors, since there are so many, just having

everyone congregate at the sidebar isn't very efficient, and

so I would bring the jurors into my chambers with just one

representative from each party, for no more than five

minutes of questioning.

And then we'll have for cause challenges, which I'll deal with on the record, to any of the 50. And if after those for cause challenges we have at least 24 jurors, I will then have the parties do their peremptory challenges. We have up to six for the plaintiffs, up to six for the defendants. I want to end up with 12, so we need 24, and we'll do it.

If we don't have 24, let's say we have only 20, what we'll do is I'll direct those 20 to come back Thursday, and we'll start up the process with the next 50. And, you know, when it's clear we'll have -- you know, then we'll have some

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for cause challenges, and then I guess we'll have to do the peremptories with the 20 left from day one and however is left with day two, is what we'll do. That's the way we'll do it.

And I believe based on the very good and excellent work we did last week, it won't take more than two days to pick the jury. We may be able to do it just in one.

But the process has worked very well and everyone worked very hard, and I want to appreciate that cooperation, and we excused a lot of jurors who clearly should have been excused.

Okay. Anything that any counsel for any of the parties wish to raise?

MR. WEINBERGER: Yes, Your Honor. On behalf of plaintiffs, Peter Weinberger.

On the voir dire issue, so maybe this is -- maybe I'm wrongly assuming, but I'm assuming that we're going to be able to voir dire the entire panel.

THE COURT: Correct. I'm going to be asking my questions of, Mr. Weinberger, of the 50, and you can address your questions to the whole 50, or you can say, juror number 33, what do you think of this; either way.

And, yes, and challenges for cause will be to the whole 50 that we're having Wednesday, right.

MR. WEINBERGER: And when we exercise

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1 peremptories, is it going to be with respect to the first 12 2 in the box? 3 THE COURT: You can exercise your peremptory 4 on anyone. I mean, you only have six. If you want to use your six on jurors 45 through 50, you can. 13:44:18 5 And the way I do it, just say we had 12 in the box, 6 and someone strikes number 6, well, then, I bring up the 7 8 first -- the next numbered juror, and he or she takes the 9 spot of number 6. And we're going to end up with 12. And the way I work it, whoever is left -- hopefully 13:44:47 10 11 all 12 are here at the end of the trial, and if so, we have 12 12 deliberate. If someone has gotten sick or had a family emergency we have only 11, and then we have only 11. But 13 14 any one of the 12 stays on. 13:45:05 15 MR. WEINBERGER: So tomorrow we'll know sort 16 of the seating chart, you know, where is the next juror up 17 sitting at? 18 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Weinberger, you'll know, 19 and you probably won't know until right then. They'll come 13:45:19 20 in, and they'll have a name and number, and we'll know. I 21 mean, we'll all have the questionnaires, so we'll know then. 22 The jury department will be doing that randomly. 23 You'll know tonight which are the 50, and then they'll come 2.4 in, and then we'll have to sort our questionnaires so we

know who is seated where.

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1 MR. WEINBERGER: And in terms of time for each 2 side for voir dire questioning, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Well, what do you think is reasonable? I normally don't allow a lot: 15, 20 minutes is 4 what I'm thinking. Because, again, these jurors have been 13:45:56 5 asked a lot of questions, a lot of very good probing 6 7 questions, and we have their answers. 8 And obviously, if a juror has expressed on his or her 9 questionnaire some hesitation, some uncertainty in the question, do you believe you can be fair and impartial, I'm 13:46:16 10 11 not going to question this juror out in this room. That's 12 what I'm going to ask that juror back in my chambers. 13 So I'm thinking maybe 20 minutes for the plaintiffs, 14 20 minutes for the defendants on, you know, other questions, 13:46:35 15 or repeating my questions. 16 MR. LANIER: Mark Lanier for plaintiffs. 17 If I understand your process right, you don't want us 18 to get answers in the global voir dire that would commit -- that would be sufficient for cause. If we look 19 13:46:58 20 like we've got someone who may have a for cause reason --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. LANIER: -- then we take them back 23 individually, and not try to mess up the whole panel. 2.4 THE COURT: That's the whole point, correct, 13:47:11 25 Mr. Lanier, of doing it back there.

1	Obviously, I don't want some juror to blurt out why he
2	or she might have a problem, and everyone is going to
3	MR. LANIER: Hear it.
4	THE COURT: One of two things will happen. It
13:47:24 5	may taint everyone, or someone may think, hah, that's how
6	I'll get off this jury. See what number 33 said? That's
7	me, too.
8	MR. LANIER: In light of that, if that's the
9	approach, then the 20 minutes should be valid for us to get
13:47:38 10	the questions we need to get out to elicit to know who to
11	take back to chambers.
12	THE COURT: That's the idea. Or, you know,
13	introduce yourself, or there's some general things you want
14	to throw out there, that's what it for.
13:47:53 15	MS. MAINIGI: Your Honor, may I ask a
16	follow-up? Enu Mainigi for Cardinal.
17	As I understood it, each one of the 50 will be taken
18	back for individual voir dire; is that correct?
19	THE COURT: I think so; or maybe to save time,
13:48:08 20	if no one has a reason to do it, then I won't. I mean, I've
21	been going back and forth as to whether we just bring
22	everyone back just to bring everyone back, or if there's
23	absolutely nothing on the questionnaire that creates any
24	issue, I don't know. I mean, do you have a strong opinion
13:48:38 25	either way?

1	MS. MAINIGI: I do, Your Honor, on behalf of
2	Cardinal. We had understood that each individual juror
3	would be invited back, and it may be that one juror, we're
4	going to be done with them in 30 seconds because no one has
13:48:51 5	any questions; but we do think we need that opportunity to
6	ask those questions, especially if we're getting 20 minutes
7	on the front end.
8	THE COURT: I may do it I may do it, if not
9	for that reason, I don't want any of the jurors to feel like
13:49:08 10	there was something wrong with them and they, you know, or
11	other jurors wondering, well, why did the Judge talk to him
12	and not me, or her or not me.
13	So I think probably out of fairness, I think it makes
14	sense to bring everyone back even if it turns out it's
13:49:26 15	really quick and nothing to ask.
16	I think it looks better, so we'll follow your
17	suggestion.
18	MS. MAINIGI: Thank you.
19	MR. NICHOLAS: Your Honor, Bob Nicholas from
13:49:35 20	AmerisourceBergen. I have a follow-up question on that
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. NICHOLAS: which is when jurors are
23	taken back individually, are we going to be making our
24	strike motions our cause motions back you know, one by
13:49:48 25	one, or are you bringing them all back and then we do it at

1 the end? 2 THE COURT: Well, I think what's efficient, 3 Mr. Nicholas, is that after we finish asking the juror the questions, the juror goes back, and then I think I might 4 say, does anyone feel this juror should be excused for 13:50:11 5 cause. And I'll take it up right then, right there, when 6 7 we're fresh on it, rather than waiting what could be an hour 8 or something, and then going back to Juror Number 23. I 9 think that's more efficient, and I think that's what we'll do, and I'll rule on it. And if no one has a challenge for 13:50:30 10 11 cause, then that's quick. And if someone does, well, then, I'll rule on it. 12 13 I think that makes sense, because what that juror has 14 said and how he or she has said it will be fresh in 13:50:47 15 everyone's mind, and it's the way to do it. 16 MR. NICHOLAS: I would agree. 17 MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, a couple of more 18 things on the plaintiffs' side. 19 As I understood your earlier ruling, you were allowing 13:51:05 20 each of the defendants to have a lawyer back and 21 interviewing an individual juror, and you were allowing us 22 one lawyer per plaintiff? 23 THE COURT: Right. MR. WEINBERGER: Can we have three lawyers on 2.4 13:51:20 25 our side? There's going to be six lawyers --

1	THE COURT: All right. You can have three.
2	It's all right, two or three. I didn't want to overwhelm
3	the I don't want the juror to feel uncomfortable.
4	Okay. All right. Any
13:51:41 5	MR. WEINBERGER: Yes, Your Honor. Sorry,
6	I'm
7	THE COURT: No. I understand, Mr. Weinberger,
8	these aren't all your questions. You might have received
9	some from colleagues. You're a spokesperson.
13:51:52 10	(Overlapping speakers.)
11	MR. WEINBERGER: I spent all night
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mea culpa.
13	THE COURT: That's all right.
14	MR. WEINBERGER: We've been discussing with
13:52:02 15	Special Master Cohen the issue of the length of the opening
16	statements, and we've made a couple of proposals.
17	Have you made a ruling on that, Your Honor?
18	THE COURT: I thought we did.
19	LAW CLERK: We did.
13:52:21 20	THE COURT: Yeah, I thought we did. I even
21	brought it out with me.
22	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Judge, there were three
23	versions that were floating through the e-mail, and all of
24	the parties agreed on what was called Version 3.
13:52:35 25	THE COURT: Well, I'll just put it on. It's

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my understanding that everyone agreed on two and a quarter hours total for plaintiffs, and 30 minutes for each defendant family, so that would be 6 times 30 is 3 hours total.

Now, that's a long opening statement for plaintiffs, and I know, Mr. Lanier, you have a very fine reputation, but I don't know too many people who can keep anyone's attention for two and a quarter hours. I've seen people who have tried, and they didn't do too well.

So if you don't want to use all two and a quarter hours, that's fine with me, and you may be helping your clients. But the parties agreed on it, so I'm not going to pull the trapdoor on you.

MR. LANIER: Thank you, Judge.

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, we submitted an e-mail to you with respect to the issue of live video streaming of the proceedings to a remote location, and we learned after that that the defendants have objection to that because of security issues.

And not to go through all of the details --

THE COURT: On that, Mr. Weinberger -- I don't want to cut you off. I'm not certain that the Court has ever permitted like live streaming of a trial outside of the courtroom. We're live streaming inside the courtroom to the overflow rooms, two of them, and I hope people can hear and

1 see.

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I mean, is it working okay in those other courtrooms?

DEPUTY CLERK: There wasn't anyone there.

THE COURT: Oh, there wasn't anyone there. I thought of it late. All right. I thought of it late.

But I don't think we've ever had actual live streaming to a location outside of the courtroom. Is that right?

Courthouse. We've never done it, and I'm not sure it's even permissible.

MR. WEINBERGER: So what our hope is, and it has to do with room in the courthouse and, you know, both sides have large teams.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WEINBERGER: And we would want to live stream it just to one location outside of the courthouse. And I don't have the details now, but I have been assured by my tech person, who has been in contact with Court Connect on this, that it can be done in a way that assures both sides that it's secure, and so there won't be a problem with security. It will help, and it has to do, frankly, Your Honor, with the whole logistics and the large teams that we have.

THE COURT: Well, let's stick with -- I mean, the defendants had -- I mean, are you proposing while the

So let me address another issue that relates to that.

1 defendants don't want to do it, you just want to do it for 2 your side? MR. WEINBERGER: Right. Right. 3 And, again, I can -- look. You ordered us to, earlier 4 on in this case, not to release ARCOS data. And despite the 13:56:11 5 fact that it was shared with large numbers of people on our 6 7 side, it never got leaked out. 8 You know, I think that's a demonstration that you can 9 trust the lawyers on our side to, with the security of this video feed, and it's just going to one location, Your Honor. 13:56:32 10 THE COURT: Well, look. It's just come up. 11 12 To say I'm not a technological expert would be a gross 13 understatement. 14 I can understand, we've got lots of lawyers. Everyone can't fit in the courtroom. I mean, even being in -- you 13:56:52 15 16 know, coming in the overflow room, as a principal matter, if 17 there's a secure way for only lawyers to see it, I don't 18 have any problem with it. I don't know if it can be done 19 securely. At least if it's done, both sides should have it. 13:57:15 20 MS. MAINIGI: Your Honor, Enu Mainigi for 21 Cardinal Health. 22 As Your Honor is aware, we do object to the live 23 streaming outside the courtroom. We do think that there's

too much room for abuse. We're not suggesting at all that

plaintiffs would do that.

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1 THE COURT: Well, how could it be abused? 2 MS. MAINIGI: Well, we are worried that it 3 could be taped. We're worried you can take your phone and 4 tape it. As I understand it, in the courtroom, people are not going to be allowed to videotape what's on stream. 13:57:43 5 THE COURT: Right. No one can walk in with 6 7 their cell phone and turn it on. 8 MS. MAINIGI: But that cannot be prevented if 9 you're live streaming to the Ritz, for example. You can't --13:57:57 10 11 THE COURT: Well, that's a good point. 12 MS. MAINIGI: You can't monitor people walking 13 in and out of the war room that are not lawyers. People, 14 witnesses who have been sequestered, perhaps, Your Honor --13:58:11 15 and I know we haven't necessarily gotten to that -- those 16 witnesses could inadvertently be wandering through. 17 We think there's way too much room for abuse here, so 18 I think it is for good reason that this Court has never 19 allowed live streaming outside the courtroom. 13:58:29 20 THE COURT: Well, to be fair, Ms. Mainigi, no 21 one has ever asked me to do it. I haven't refused to, it 22 never came up, so I never had to deal with it. 23 MR. WEINBERGER: So let me tell you, so we 2.4 have an office in the Old Post Office building so we're not 13:58:47 25 talking about the Ritz, Your Honor. And we can represent to

1	the Court that where we would video stream it into that
2	office would be a segregated room with no phones and no
3	recording equipment. And if we need to hire a deputy to
4	assure the defense that we're following whatever order comes
13:59:09 5	out of the Court, we're happy to do that.
6	THE COURT: So, you know, I mean
7	MS. MAINIGI: Your Honor, it seems like a
8	whole lot of work and effort. I don't understand why all
9	the lawyers here
13:59:21 10	THE COURT: Well, I mean, it
11	MS. MAINIGI: cannot come to the courtroom
12	in the overflow courtroom. That's what everybody is
13	planning to do. That is what Your Honor indicated we needed
14	to do.
14:00:02 15	THE COURT: Well, since I've never done this,
16	I'm concerned. And particularly since the defendants are
17	objecting, I'm concerned about the security.
18	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Just so everybody is
19	clear, there are two
14:00:19 20	THE COURT: And apparently, I've been reminded
21	that live streaming was discouraged at a Judges' meeting. I
22	must have not been paying attention at that meeting, or
23	maybe I was absent; but I'm concerned about it.
24	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Judge, there are two
14:00:42 25	overflow courtrooms, and the wells in both of those

1	courtrooms are available for counsel.
2	THE COURT: Right. Counsel can sit there.
3	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: The entire well.
4	THE COURT: You can sit there and work, do
14:00:53 5	whatever you want. The only thing you can't do a record.
6	DEPUTY CLERK: First come, first seated.
7	THE COURT: Right. But the point is, I mean,
8	you can that's what they are there for. That's why I
9	provided for two overflow courtrooms, to make sure, you
14:01:11 10	know, anyone will be able to sit. And there's a lot of
11	room. You see all the seats there. Those wells are empty.
12	So all those seats will be available. The jury box is
13	available. There should be plenty of room.
14	So I think we're not going to have the live streaming.
14:01:30 15	MR. WEINBERGER: All right. One follow-up
16	issue, Your Honor.
17	The directive that we heard is that, particularly in
18	here, we can't have our lawyers using laptops when they're
19	sitting behind the rail. And so people at the trial table
14:01:50 20	here are going to be communicating with people who have
21	laptops and smartphones to get exhibits, to plan for the
22	next day, et cetera, et cetera.
23	THE COURT: Right.
24	MR. WEINBERGER: So we would ask the Court's
14:02:05 25	indulgence to allow the lawyers working with us, who are

1	lucky enough to get seated behind the jury rail in this
2	courtroom, to be able to use laptops and smartphones.
3	Obviously, turning off any sound or any it will also
4	facilitate that people won't be walking back and forth
14:02:27 5	between
6	THE COURT: Right.
7	MR. WEINBERGER: the space behind the jury
8	rail and the trial tables.
9	MR. STOFFELMAYR: Your Honor, if I may, Kapsar
14:02:38 10	Stoffelmayr for Walgreens. I was asked on behalf of the
11	defendants to raise the same issue. We think we will be
12	able to be much more efficient, run a smoother operation.
13	THE COURT: Well, I do, too. I'm going to
14	trust lawyers. If the public says what are you doing; well,
14:02:56 15	they're on the trial team, and they're communicating with
16	each other, and rather than having to interrupt and walk
17	back and forth, and stuff. All right.
18	I trust all of you to not be secretly recording. I
19	mean, quite frankly, someone could have some device in their
14:03:11 20	briefcase or whatever, and no one would know.
21	LAW CLERK: We're not reserving seats.
22	THE COURT: I know. We're not reserving
23	seats, but I will allow lawyers working on this case.
24	I'll allow lawyers to do it in this courtroom so long
14:03:34 25	as they're not being obtrusive. There can't be typing

1 noise, tapping that's disruptive. 2 MR. STOFFELMAYR: Your Honor, can I just ask 3 that that ruling include at least one paralegal per party? 4 We were especially concerned about the exhibits. LAW CLERK: Now we're talking about reserving 14:03:50 5 6 sheets. 7 THE COURT: No, we're not reserving any seats. 8 I will allow a paralegal to have a laptop to communicate 9 with the lawyers. 14:04:00 10 MR. STOFFELMAYR: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: But, again, you got to do it in a 12 way not to allow any sound. I'll allow that, we'll just do 13 it. 14 MR. WEINBERGER: And finally, Your Honor, 14:04:21 15 realizing that you have portable microphones, we are 16 wondering how strict you are in terms of having to stay at 17 the podium when we're giving opening, when we're inquiring 18 of a witness, et cetera. 19 THE COURT: All right. I'm not strict. The 14:04:41 20 only thing, I have two rules, Mr. Weinberger: One, you have 21 to be audible for our court reporter, wherever you are; and 22 number two, I don't let anyone, like, crowd into the jurors' 23 space. I've seen lawyers who have done that, and I've

But if you, you know, so you've got to be -- those are

required them to step back.

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14:05:00 25

my only two rules. So if you want to --1 2 DEPUTY CLERK: The batteries on the portable 3 microphones are not the greatest, and they don't last two 4 and a quarter hours. So --THE COURT: That may be the way to limit you, 14:05:23 5 Mr. Lanier. 6 7 DEPUTY CLERK: So the only question would be, 8 if you're done, please put the one that you've used back on 9 the track, take another one, so they're constantly charging. THE COURT: I wouldn't do that, intentionally 14:05:39 10 11 give you a short-life battery, Mr. Lanier. 12 But the point is, make sure that the court reporter 13 can hear you clearly and you're not crowding the jurors. 14 But I don't mind, some lawyers like to be at counsel table, 14:05:58 15 some at the podium, some like to walk around. It's okay. 16 MR. STOFFELMAYR: Your Honor, we had one 17 additional question. It's Kaspar Stoffelmayr, back in the 18 corner here. 19 We were just curious if the Court intended to issue a 14:06:21 20 Rule 16 order to exclude witnesses. And if so, our request 21 is that it would not include expert witnesses, so that 22 expert witnesses can be in court to watch testimony, but 23 fact witnesses could not. 2.4 THE COURT: No one has raised it, so I don't 14:06:37 25 generally in a civil case exclude witnesses, but if there's

1	a particular reason to do so someone should raise it with
2	me.
3	Mr. Stoffelmayr, no one has raised that, and I
4	generally don't issue it in a civil case as a
14:06:58 5	MR. STOFFELMAYR: All right. Why don't we
6	discuss it
7	THE COURT: Why don't you discuss it and see
8	what you want to do.
9	MR. STOFFELMAYR: Great. Thank you.
14:07:21 10	THE COURT: Okay. Special Master Cohen
11	advised me that well, I figured it would be around now.
12	The jury department has identified the 50 who we're
13	calling in now, so we can share that with counsel.
14	DEPUTY CLERK: I would just like to ask all of
14:07:39 15	you, if you do have any staff that manages to get a seat in
16	the Front Row, can you please have them bring some kind of
17	identification for the Court security officers so they know
18	that those people are allowed to use the laptops.
19	THE COURT: That's a good idea.
14:07:59 20	DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
22	We're adjourned.
23	DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
24	
25	(Proceedings adjourned at 2:08 p.m.)

${\tt C} \; {\tt E} \; {\tt R} \; {\tt T} \; {\tt I} \; {\tt F} \; {\tt I} \; {\tt C} \; {\tt A} \; {\tt T} \; {\tt E}$ I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ Donnalee Cotone _____15th of October, 2019 DONNALEE COTONE, RMR, CRR, CRC DATE Realtime Systems Administrator